A Brief Proof of the Existence of an alpha-Core for Generalized Strategy Games

A Brief Proof of the Existence of an $\alpha$-Core for Generalized Strategy Games

Marakulin V. M.

УДК 519.833.5 
DOI: 10.33048/semi.2025.22.C04  
MSC 91A06, 91A10


Аннотация:

This paper studies the problem of whether an $\alpha$-core exists (is non-empty) for generalized normal-form games where player payoffs are described by point-to-set convex-valued, irreflexive, and weakly continuous preferences. We propose a short effective proof of the non-emptiness of the core; it based on a contradiction with Brouwer's theorem on the existence of a fixed point for a continuous mapping of a convex compact set into itself.

Ключевые слова: generalized strategic game, $\alpha$-core, Brouwer's fixed point theorem.